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“may … proceed to prosecute the alleged mis-
conduct in this case.”  The high court stated:
This matter presents a novel ethical 
issue:  whether an attorney can direct 
someone to “friend” an adverse, rep-
resented party on Facebook and gather 
information about the person that is not 
otherwise available to the public.  No 
reported case law in our State addresses 
the question.  Consistent with the goals 
of the disciplinary process, the court 
rules do not close off further inquiry if 
a DEC Secretary declines to docket an 
important, novel issue as to which there 
is little guidance, or mistakenly declines 
to docket an allegation of egregious, 
unethical conduct.  The Director of the 
OAE, by virtue of the broader scope of 
his position, sees the breadth of issues 
raised throughout the State and is aware 
of national trends.  The public is best 
served by a system that permits both 
volunteers in the DECs and professionals 
in the OAE to assess challenging ethical 
matters like the one presented in this case.
A similar misuse of Facebook “friending” 
resulted in a determination by the San Diego 
County Bar Association in 2011 that an attor-
ney had violated his ethical duty not to deceive. 
The attorney represented a client in a wrongful 
discharge action and obtained from his client a 
list of former co-workers.  The attorney sent a 
Facebook “friend” request to two high-ranking 
company employees whom the client believed 
were not happy with their employer and were 
likely to make disparaging remarks about 
the employer on their Facebook pages.  The 
“friend” request only included the attorney’s 
name and did not disclose his representation 
of the complaining employee or the purpose 
of the “friending.”
If a librarian is asked to help someone 
obtain information on Facebook about a third 
party, it is wise to keep in mind that Facebook 
users have privacy rights (and privacy settings 
on Facebook).  It is unwise and perhaps even 
illegal for a librarian to assist someone to 
evade or penetrate those privacy settings by 
“friending” in bad faith.
And if that’s not enough of a problem, some 
states have entered the fight over Facebook 
“friends” by passing laws making it illegal 
for state teachers to “friend” their students 
In August, a Florida appellate court made the news when it rejected a claim that a judge presiding over a dispute between a law firm 
and its former client should be disqualified 
because the judge is a Facebook “friend” with 
a lawyer representing a potential witness and 
potential party in the pending litigation.  See 
Herssein v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 2017 
Fla. App. LEXIS 12035 (3d Dist. 2017).  The 
appellate court didn’t think that being a Face-
book “friend” meant much.
For librarians, this case may not seem very 
relevant to their work or lives, and it probably 
isn’t unless you happen to be a party to a law-
suit and try to “friend” the judge or vice versa. 
That actually happened in another Florida case. 
(Is there something in the water?)
A trial judge in Florida sent a “friend” re-
quest to a female litigant whose divorce case 
was pending before him.  On advice of counsel, 
she decided not to respond to the invitation. 
The judge thereafter ruled against the woman, 
attributing most of the marital debt to her and 
providing her ex-husband with a disproportion-
ately excessive alimony award.  The woman 
moved to disqualify the judge in her case. 
The judge himself heard her motion and not 
surprisingly denied it as not “legally sufficient.” 
To determine whether a motion to disqual-
ify is “legally sufficient,” a court must decide 
whether the alleged facts which, accepted 
as true, would prompt a reasonably prudent 
person to fear that she could not get a fair and 
impartial trial before that judge.  The appellate 
court granted her motion, holding that:
It seems clear that a judge’s ex parte 
communication with a party presents a 
legally sufficient claim for disqualifica-
tion, particularly in the case where the 
party’s failure to respond to a Facebook 
“friend” request creates a reasonable fear 
of offending the solicitor.  The “friend” 
request placed the litigant between the 
proverbial rock and 
a hard place:  either 
engage in improp-
er ex parte com-
munications with 
the judge presid-
ing over the case 
or risk offending 
the judge by not 
accepting the 
“friend” request.
The case is Chace v. Loisel, 170 So. 3d 802 
(Fla. Ct. of App., 5th Dist., 2014).
So, if you stay out of court, are librarians 
free from worrying about the legality of Face-
book “friending?”  Not necessarily.  Librarians 
may be drawn into ethical disputes if they are 
asked to help do research that involves Face-
book or other social media.  For example, two 
New Jersey lawyers have been the target of 
ethics charges for attempting to gain improper 
access to Facebook information.  Robertelli v. 
New Jersey Office of Atty. Ethics, 224 N.J. 
470, 134 A.3d 963 (2016).
The N.J. Office of Attorney Ethics began an 
investigation of the lawyers representing the 
defendants in a personal injury case against a 
municipality, its police department, and a po-
liceman who was involved in the accident.  In 
order to obtain information about the plaintiff 
(named Hernandez), the defense attorneys 
directed a paralegal employed by their firm 
to search the Internet.  Among other sources, 
she accessed Hernandez’s Facebook page. 
Initially, the page was open to the public.  At a 
later point, the privacy settings on the account 
were changed to limit access only to Facebook 
users who were Hernandez’s “friends.”  The 
ethics office claimed that the defense attorneys 
directed the paralegal to access and continue to 
monitor the non-public pages of Hernandez’s 
Facebook account.  She therefore submitted 
a “friend request” to Hernandez, without 
revealing that she worked for the law firm 
representing defendants or that she was inves-
tigating him in connection with the lawsuit. 
Hernandez accepted the friend request, and the 
paralegal was able to obtain information from 
the non-public pages of his Facebook account. 
When the plaintiff learned of these facts, he 
objected to use of the information in the trial 
and filed a grievance with the ethics office.
The local bar committee refused to docket 
the grievance on the ground that the allegations, 
if proven, would not constitute 
unethical conduct.  A state 
trial court affirmed that deci-
sion.  The state ethics office 
disagreed and appealed to 
the New Jersey Supreme 
Court (the ultimate author-
ity on ethical matters in the 
state).  The Supreme Court 
reversed the trial court and 
ordered that the ethics office 
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on Facebook.  In 2011, Governor Jay Nixon 
signed Missouri State Bill 54, which bans stu-
dents and teachers from communicating and 
being “friends” on the social networking site. 
(The law is intended to prevent inappropriate 
relationships between children and teachers.) 
So if you are a librarian in a state school, you 
should check out your state’s laws before 
“friending” a student … for any reason.  
Bill Hannay is a partner at the Chica-
go-based law firm, Schiff Hardin LLP, a 
regular speaker at the Charleston Confer-
ence, and a frequent contributor to Against 
the Grain.  In his spare time, he is an Adjunct 
Professor of Law at IIT/Chicago-Kent law 
school and a playwright.
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QUESTION:  A college librarian asks 
about possible copyright violations when us-
ing lecture capture and that lecture includes 
copyrighted materials.
ANSWER:  The first important follow 
up question deals with how is the lecture 
captured.  Podcast with sound only?  Or is it 
filmed?  Further, much of the answer depends 
on what the college does with the lectures 
at that point.  Are they posted on the web? 
Available over Youtube?  Posted in a course 
management system available only to mem-
bers of the class?  
If the lecture capture is sound only, there 
is unlikely to be a problem at all.  Section 
110(1) of the Copyright Act if 1976 permits 
the performance of  nondramatic literary and 
musical works in a classroom in a nonprofit 
educational institution as a part of instruc-
tion.  Therefore, capturing the reading of a 
poem, an essay, etc., or singing of a song is 
not problematic.  Where the lecture is then 
stored and who may access may be a problem; 
that will be discussed below.  It the lecture is 
videorecorded, then graphic works and pho-
tographs may be captured, and section 110(1) 
permits that.  Note that audiovisual works are 
not included.  Section 110(1) does not permit 
the performance of entire audiovisual works 
without permission of the copyright owner 
even in the course of instruction.  But small 
portions of such works included in a lecture 
capture are likely fair use.
Placing captured lectures on the web so 
that anyone may access them is not a good 
idea.  Putting them in a course management 
system with access restricted to students 
enrolled in the course causes no copyright 
problems even if the lecture includes por-
tions of copyrighted audiovisual 
works.  Section 110(2) of the 
Act allows transmission of 
performances or displays 
of nondramatic literary 
or musical works and 
portions of audiovisual 
works without permis-
sion of the copyright 
owner if access is 
restricted to stu-
dents enrolled in 
the course.  Trans-
mitting a captured 
lecture that contains an entire audiovisual 
work and making it available even to enrolled 
students requires permission of the copyright 
owner.
QUESTION:  A university librarian asks 
about works created through artificial intel-
ligence (AI) and who owns the copyright in 
such works.
ANSWER:  Copyright experts debated 
this issue for years before there were actual 
creative works produced by a computer.  To-
day, there are many types of computer-gen-
erated works including poetry, paintings, 
software and music, etc.  According to news 
reports, Google has even created sounds that 
no human has heard before.  The courts in 
the United States have always held that only 
works of human authorship may receive a 
copyright.  Consider the reason that copyright 
exists in this country, to enable owners to reap 
the economic benefit from their works that, in 
turn, will encourage them to continue to pro-
duce copyrighted works, which thus benefits 
the public.  Would awarding a copyright to 
a computer encourage it to create additional 
works?  No.
This is similar to the way courts have dealt 
with whether animals can own copyright.  The 
answer has also been no, because only human 
authors can make the decisions about whether 
to grant licenses for the use of their works, etc.
With AI created works increasing, it may 
be that Congress and the courts will have to 
revisit this issue in the future.  As we learn 
more about animal intelligence and creativity 
perhaps, the human authorship requirement 
should also be reconsidered for works by 
animals.
QUESTION:  A library director asks what 
has happened with the suit Louisiana State 
University (LSU) filed against Elsevier over 
a contract dispute about whether the LSU 
School of Veterinary Medicine was included 
in the overall university contract for access 
to Elsevier’s journals.
ANSWER:  The short answer is that the 
case has settled.  The suit was filed in May 
2017 in Louisiana state court.  (Contract dis-
putes typically are matters governed 
by state law and decided 
in state courts.)  The vet 
school had separately 
subscribed to Elsevi-
er content but decid-
ed that the contract 
would not be renewed 
when it expired in 
2016 because the 
university’s con-
tract covered its 
35,000 students, 
staff and faculty, 
and the vet school is a part of the university. 
In October, Elsevier cut off vet school access; 
LSU wrote to Elsevier and had that access 
reactivated.  The vet school asked to add 
some medical and veterinary titles to LSU’s 
2017 subscription.  Elsevier quoted a price 
and LSU confirmed its acceptance of these 
terms.  Nevertheless, in January 2017, access 
was again terminated.  
According to LSU, Elsevier then refused 
to honor the agreement or to license any of the 
agreed upon titles to LSU.  So, the question be-
fore the court was whether there was a valid of-
fer and acceptance.  By letter in April, Elsevier 
suggested that LSU add the desired veterinary 
medicine titles to its existing contract and pay 
an additional $170,000 in subscription costs 
plus $30,000 as a cost increase to the overall 
contract.  LSU’s existing contract with Else-
vier is about $1.5 million annually.
Elsevier says that the dispute arose because 
LSU, without paying for it, was asking the 
publisher to add a school that previously was 
separate.  The LSU contract did not include 
the vet school, further, neither was there any 
merger of the university and the school for the 
contract negotiated.
An interesting issue the case raised was 
jurisdiction.  Elsevier is a Dutch company and 
its contracts usually require that litigation take 
place in the Netherlands.  This is common for 
corporations whether foreign or domestic.  U.S. 
companies typically would specify the state in 
which the company headquarters is located as 
the jurisdiction for lawsuits.  A problem for 
state supported colleges and universities is that 
they are often required by state statute to sign 
contracts only if the contracts specify that state 
as the jurisdiction for any disputes to be settled.
QUESTION:  A publishing librarian 
asks whether the exceptions for nonprofit 
educational uses in a classroom and for 
distance education also apply to nonprofit 
educational publishers.
